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Chapter I Introduction.
When the hour of conflict came on August 1, 1914, there were
strikes in progress at St. Petersburg and other Russian cities.
Civil discontent was rife, and anxiouc observers Relieved that the
country was on the verse of another upheaval. To the Oermans it
seemed that the war would find Russia rent asunder by disorder, but
they were doomed to disappointment, as the course of events revealed.
Among her allies, a profound impression of Russias' inexhaus-
tible strength was generally prevalent at the commencement of the
2great war. Little consideration was given by the public of London
and Faris to her difficulties. The vast wei*£it of the mighty
Russian Qnpire fired the imagination of statesmen, combatants, and
3
populace alike, Russia's trials and misfortunes in previous cam-
paigns were instantly forgotten. When it was realized that the
whole resources of a state numbering 173,0C0,0C0 of people were being
thrown into the scale against the Teutonic league, it seemed to many
4
that the war was already won. The Czar, it was said, was mobiliz-
ing millions upon millions of men. Countless hordes of Cossacks, so
the wild stories ran, were to swee^ across the Prussian plains and
thunder against the gates of Berlin. The vision of the conquering
Cossack was so universal that fables about trainloads of Cossacks
1. The Times History 0* The War
,
V. 3, p. 219.
2. The 3re.it War , V. 3, p. 117.
3. The Times History 0* The War
,
V. 3, p. 201.
4. Ibid., p. 201.
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passing thru England cn their way to northern France rained wide-
spread currency and had at last to be contradicted officially by the
Eritish government . ^ The conviction that Russian armies would rap-
idly march frcm triumph to triumph, as they did in the Seven Year's
War, was less easy to chasten. The Russian armies "/ere likened to
a steam-roller, and the phrase, "the Russian steam-roller" obtained
a great vogue in France and England. The popular impression was
that the "steam—roller" would overcome all obstacles and ponderously
3pursue its way to the Pmssian capital without a halt.
Such thoughts were for the most part mere flights of the fancy,
for Russia's difficulties were soon proved to be manifold. She had
the men and they flocked in from all part3 o*" the Empire. But she
experienced great difficulties in arming such colossal numbers, for
there were embarrassing shortages of equipment of every kind, from
clothing tc guns.
The Russian army had made gre:.t progress during the previous
decide. Since the disaster: in Manchuria it had been transformed
cut of recognition. The trouble was that equipment was utterly lack-
ing for mobilization on a scale commensurate with the bigness of the
country. 4 The supply of material of war was the crucial problem for
Russia from the beginning. The development of Russian industry,
satisfactory as had been it3 progress in recent years, had not at-
tained the capacity of supplving unaided the material required for
warfare on such an unprecedented scale, and in particular the
1. The Times History Of The War
.
V. 3, p. 201.
2. Ibia .. p. 201.
3. Ibid
., p. 201.
4. The Ire at War
,
V. 3, p. 118,

~
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necessary munitions.
Next to difficulties of equipment came difficulties of trans-
re rt. Germany has the most highly developed railroad system for the
extent of her territory of anv nation in the world. Not only is
every point of any consequence on her French frontier covered by
railroads, but all such points on her Russian frontier as well. Her
total milea?? is about 35, COO miles. 5 Russia, with her vast extent
of territory has about the 3ame number. Austria has 25,000 miles of
railroads, a great deal of which are along her northern frontier,
4giving her a complete network of transportation in that part. It
is in her railroad system that the great material strength of Ger-
many both for offence and defence is to be found. There are two,
and in some places three main railroad lines running all around the
frontier by Breslau, Fosen, and Thorn, all of which hav? many con-
nections with central Germany. Breslau has 3evsn different railroads
running out of it, and the frontier between Breslau and Cracow is
gridircned with lines whose purposes were military rather than eco-
nomic. *" A rapid concentration at any point on the frontier is, there-
fore, easy for Germany. There were only four lines of railroads
actually crossing the frontier from East Prussia into Russia, and
one from Ratibor, on the Austrian frontier, to Warsaw, Poland.
The Russian system of railroads is very inferior to the German,
or for that matter, to the Austrian. Many of the roads have only
1. The Greit War
,
V. 5, p. 118.
2. The World' s Work
,
November 1914, p. 17.
3. Ibid
. ,p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 18.
5. Ibid ., p. 18.
6. Ibid,, p. 18.
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single lines of track, their construction is inferior, stations wiJe
apart, and speed slower. They cannot carry the same amount of
traffic as those of their opponents. The guage of the German and
Austrian railroads is the 3ame--4 feet 8-J inches, so that rolling
stock can be usea interchangeably. The Russian guage is five feet,
so that their equipment cannot be used in Germany and Austria. The
Germans had devised a method, however, by which it was possible to
extend the distance between the car-wheels along the axles so as to
make the altered wheel base fit the Russian guage, in case of a Ger-
man invasion of Russia. The German military machine was designed
for dependence upon railways. When the Germans invaded Belgium and
France, they found ready to hand an elaborate system of railways
almost as complex and as efficient as their own. 4 When they entered
Fcland and had to march painfully over an almost ro-idless land, their
efficiency was speedily decreased. Whenever the Germans "ere cut off
from the locomotive, their offensive gradually lost momentum. The
Russian soldiers marched tc war on their own feet, and bore the hard-
3hips of slow progress more successfully.
Another difficulty which greatly hampered Russia was her isola-
tion. She wis everywhere cut off fro::, the open sea save at distant
Vladivostok, on the Pacific, where a passage was cut thru the ice
auring the winter with great difficulty. The Baltic was at once
closed to her. After Turkey declared war, the Black Sea was hermet-
1. The World' s Work
,
November, 1914, p. 18.
2. Ibid.
, y. 18.
5. Ibid
. , p. 18.
4. The Tines History Of The War
,
V. 5, p. 202.
5. Ibid., p. 202.
6. Ibid
,, p. 202.

ically sealed for the war. Archangel, was, ordinarily, shut in by
ice from October to May, and was in any case inadequately served by
rail, though steps were quickly taken to improve the railway line,
and, by means of icebreakers, tc keer the port open a longer time
than usual. ^ Russia needed va3t quantities of supplies from her
Allies, and for a long time very few of her requirements could be
met, save to a small extent thru Vladivostok and Archangel. Russi i 1 s
troubles did not end here. Her crowning difficulty was the config-
uration and character of her frontier, to which attention must now
be paid. 2
The Russian boundary of the Teutonic empires taken as a whole
resembles the ficure of a capital S turned backwards, with East
Prussia filling the upper recess, Russian Poland the lower, and
Galicia falling just below the tail. As a result of this curious
configuration, Poland was thrust like a gre it broad wedge far into
th3 territory of the Central Powers. From the point where the River
Warta crossed from Russian to Prussian ground, the distance to Ber-
lin was only 180 miles. Small wonder that the uninstruct ed, knowing
nothing of Germany's means of defence, dreamed of Russian troops
passing down Unter den Linden within a few weeks of the outbreak of
the war, thus repeating the old-time tradition of the Seven Year 1 3
War. 4
Poland was in fact, a veritable sorespot for Russia. On the
north the provinces of West and East Prussia curved far over Poland.
1. The Times History Of The War
,
V. 3, p. 202.
2. Ibid ., p. 202-03.
3. The ^reat War
,
V. 3, pp. 119-120.
4. The Times Hi3tory Of The War
,
V. 3, p. 203.
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On the south the Austrian province of Oalicia not only enwrapped the
whole southern Polish border but it reached the Russian provinces of
Vclhynia and Podolia, and even touched Bessarabia. Poland was thus
a dangerous salient for Russia. A Russian army advancing thru the
center of Poland would be threatened on both its flanks. The Teuton-
ic allies could launch their blows from three sides at the heart of
Poland, and the remarkable efficiency of their strategical railways
enabled them to transfer their forces from one part of the frontier
to another with such rapidity and secrecy that it was impossible for
the Russians to foresee from what direction a deadly thrust was to
be expected. 2 Therefore, before Russia could think of a march to
Berlin, she had to clear her threatened flanks and make sure that she
could not be assailed from either East Prussia or Salicia. As was
to be expected, instead of marching on Berlin, she found the greater
p irt of the province of Poland overrun by the enemy. ^ Her efforts
to rid herself of the invaders not only constituted a great part of
the first steps of the war; they were, in fact, almost as effective
as the process of invading Pmssia, which the ignorant expected, be-
cause in the long and fierce combats which ensued, Russia was able
slowly but persistently to wear down the strength of her opronent3. 4
Let us now examine the ^rentiers of Russia, Germany, ind
Austria-Hungary conjointly. The military and political problems
they presented were so interdependent that a correct conception of
the position can only be gained by passing in imagination at will
5
-cross boundaries which were in the main artificial. The Russian
1. The Times History Of The War
,
V. 3, p. 203.
2. The Great War , V. 3, p. 121.
3. Th e TiL.es Fi3tory 0* The War, V. 3, p. 203.
4.
"
Td~icu
.~7"P^
5. Ibid. > p.. 203.
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Baltic provinces of Kovno and Courland .ire flat pliins with sc^rely
a ridge, and for the most part thinly populated, From a quarter to
one third of their whole area was covered with forests, and the im-
pression conveyed in a journey thru them to Petrograd wa3 of an al-
most empty thickly-wooded land. 1 There was a considerable German
population, especially in the towns, and a good deal of the territory
was held by magnates of German descent. German influence has for
centuries been very marked in western Russia, and the factor thus
2presented was not without its influence upon the war.
The noteworthy features of this great plain are its water-
courses. The general direction of the rivers is northwards, since
they mostly rise in the Carpathians or their foothills and em^ty into
the Baltic Sea.**1 Beginning in the east we encounter the Niemen,
which runs roughly parallel with the eastern frontier of East Prussia,
for a distance of about eighty miles, between the Russian fortresses
Grodno and Kovno. Along that stretch its average distance from the
Prussian frontier is about fifty miles. Bending to the west after
passing Kovno, the Niemen penetrates the Prussian boundary, where it
is about 500 yards wide, and reaches the Baltic Sea as the German
4Memel. Thi3 long strip of territory between the Niemei and East
I-russia was destined to be the scene of much desperate fighting dur-
ing the '"irst few months of the war. It is a wild and desolate
1. The Times History 0* The War
,
V. 3, p. 203.
2. Ibid
.
,
p. 204. The recent revolution in Russia, March, 1917,
is said to have been directed for the rao3t part, against the
German influence which surrounded the Russian court.
3
-
The Great War
,
V. 3, p. 12C.
4. Ibid.
?
r. 120.
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lana, full of '"crests, small lakes, and marshes. 1 It3 southern half
.v-s nearly filled up by the great forest of Augustovo, in the midst
cf which stood the town of Suwalki. The whole strip was classified
as Foland, and Napoleon knew it well, for the bulk of the Grand Army
2
traversed it, and crossed the Niemei at Kovno and Grodno in 1812.
It was in this very forest, as will be seen, that the Russian army
made its stand after the catastrophe at Tannenberg and forced the
Germans into retreat towards their own border. It should be under-
stood that the whole of the fighting in this region turned upon the
repeated German attempts to make good th 1 passage of the Niemen.
The statement that in this area the Niemera was the natural frontier
of Russia was not an idle one. The river was of the utmost value to
Russia, for among other things, it protected in part the vital main
4line of railway from Petrognd to Warsaw.
The Vistula, by far the largest and most important river of this
region, rising in the Carpathians, flows by Cracow and reaches War-
saw by a long sweeping curve to the left, after forming the northern
boundary of Galicia thruout a third of this section of its course.
^
Just below Warsaw, the Vistula turns westward and reaches the German
boundary, after flowing in a generally northwestern direction, about
twelve miles above the fortress of Thorn, Then traversing West
Prussia it empties into the Gulf of Dantzig. As the Niemen dominat-
ed strategy farther north, so the Vistula was the chief factor of
1. The Times History Of Th e War , V. 3, p. 204.
2. Ibid
., r . 204.
3. Ibid,,p. 2C4.
4. Ibid
. , p. 205. See also The Wo rid' s Work , November 1914,
T p. 19-21.
5. The Great War, V. 3, p. 120.
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stratsgy in the centre of Poland. The Germans were astride its low-
er reaches; but where the river curved southward at Warsaw it present-
ed an obstacle athwart the line of German advance which was to stand
Rusaia in good stead. The Vistula had important tributaries: the
San, arrro aching it ^rcm the eight near the point where it leaves the
Galician boundary; and the Bug, also from the right, eighteen miles
below Warsaw, after this latter tributary has been swelled by the
2
waters c* the Narev, which empties into it on the right. The Bug
rises in eastern Galicia and flows thru Brest Litovsk, 150 miles
east of Warsaw, where there was an immense military depot protected
by a ring of forts, the main base of supplies for all Russian opera-
te
tions in Poland. East of Brest Litovsk there is a lar^e tract of
almost impenetrable country, the Pripet marshes, one o^ a number of
such swampy areas in Russia, which are a consequence and character-
istic of the ill-defined water-part img 3. 4 The Narev with its tribu-
tary the Bobr and the frequent marshes along their course are an
important defensive feature of the region opposite the southeastern
frontier of East Prussia. ^
Across the border lay East Prussia,the idolized province of the
Prussian Junkers. Just as in the north the object of Germany was to
negotiate the passage of the Hi em en, so the very first object of the
Russians was to drive out the German garrisons , which were believed
to be weak. East Prussia was the mo3t bleak and dreary of the Ger-
1. The Tines History Of The War
,
V. 3, p. 207.
2. The Great War
,
V. 3, p. 120.
3. Ibid
. ,p. 120-21.
4. Ibiu. ,p. 121.
5. The Times History Cf The War
,
V. 3, p. 205.
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man provinces. 1 It was part of the great plain which sloped down to
the sand dunes of the Baltic Sea. Great quantities of rye and pota-
toes were grown on i + s open lands, but its chief characteristic,
which played such an important role in the battles to ccrae, was found
in the almost impenetrable tangle of lakes and woods and swamps in
the south-eastern portion, all along the Ku33ian frontier.* This
region is called the Masurian Lake region, or more accurately, is
Ifaeurla. This area was real'y a continuation of the Russian strip
within the angle of the Niemen, but it constituted even more diffi-
cult country for military operations, and was believed to form a more
useful defence of German territory than any artillery position. A
scheme for draining and cultivating it had been prudently rejected
on military grounds. It was protected by a system of blockhouses,
and there were garrisons in the various small towns in its recesses,
while the Germans had not neglected to endow it with several of the
4
railway lines upon which they so greatly leaned.
It is now necessary to explain in detail the fortified positions
prepared in this area by the Pussians and Germans. Although the
latter power dependea in the main on its armies and splendid equip-
ment of railways, it had by no means neglected the construction of
modern strongholds—to support its defence and serve as a basis for
offensive operations. 5 The principal fortress in East Prussia was
n
Konigsberg, the second capital of Prussia situated on the River
Fregel. It possessed an inner and outer line of works, beyond which
1. The Times History Of The Tar, V. 3, p. 205.
2. Ibid
.
,
p. 205.
3. Ibid ., p. 205.
4. Ibid
., p. 205.
5. The great War, V. 3, p. 122.
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were twelve detached forts, six on each side of the Pregel. In ad-
dition, there were two other l^r^e and powerful -forts, that of
Friedrichsburg, on an island in the river, to the west of the city,
and the Kaserne Kronprinz, within the ramparts on the eastern side.
Koni.Tsberg ranked as a first-class fortress, and was the head-
quarters of the first Army Corps. It lies far within the great
Frische Lagoon, on a wooded peninsula, with a stsep and forbidding
coast. On the loner spit of land forming the seaward side of the
lagoon, lies the entrenched camp of Pillau, twenty-nine miles from
Konigsberg. ^ The whole Konigsberg area required to be treated with
great respect, and when the Russians first invaded East Prussia,
they only sought to mask the fortress. The only other important
protective feature in East Prussia was the Masurian region, which
formed a natural means of defence.
On the line of the Lower Vistula, in the province of East
Frussia, there were other powerful fortresses. Dantzig, at the
mouth of the river, was a ^irst-class fortress and entrenched camp,
4
ana its approaches could be inundated on the eastern side. There
were powerful works opposite Dirschau, twenty mile3 to the south,
forming a bridgehead guarding the main line to Konigsberg and Fet-
ro-^rad.° About forty—five miles farther south wa3 the strong fort-
ress of Graudenz, on the right bank of the Vistula, forming another
valuable bridgehead. At a point ninetv-two miles 3cuth of Dantzig,
ana twelve miles from the Russian frontier at Alexandrowo, stood
1. The Times History 0* The War
,
V. 3, p. 213.
2. Ibid
., p. 213.
3. Ibid .
.
p . 214.
4. Ibic
.
, p. 214.
5. Ibid
, ,
p. 214.

Thorn, a fortress which * .3 one cf the main defences of eastern Gter—
cany. 1 The town was on the right bank of the Vistula, but both banks
were fortified. There wis the usual circle of detached forts, eight
on the right bank and five on the left. Thorn has been the most
important German fortress for the operations in the eastern theatre
curing the present war, although it has never once been attackea.
Thorn was the pivot for von Hindenburg 1 s railway strategy and one of
the bases from which he delivered his repeated blows against Warsaw
in the autumn of 1914. Thorn and Dantzig have been compared to
Metz and Ftrassburg, and have been described as "bastions, as it were
A
commanding the curtain between them." The whole Lower Vistula, was,
in short, very strongly hela.
Eelow Thorn there was much marsh country on both sides of the
frontier, but at the point where the valley of the Wart a entered
5Prussian territory, the need for artificial protection again began.
Accordingly the great artificial railway centre of Possn, which
stood on an open sandy plain, was provided with an immense entrench-
ed camp, which had to be reckoned with by any lar?e army marching
aue rest from Warsaw on Eerlin. South cf Posen there were yet more
:.. ..rsh lands. An inner line of defence possessed by Eastern Germany
was the line of the Oder, which could, however, be easily crossed by
an invading army in its upper reaches in Silesia. 7 Strong garrisons
1. The Times History Of The W ar, V. 3, p. 214.
2. The "reat War
,
V. 3, p. 122.
3. Ibia., p. 122.
4 * The Times History r The War
,
V. 3, p. 214,
5. Ibia ., p. 214.
5. Ibia .. p. 214.
7. Iria., r . 214.
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were maintained at Oppeln and Brealau, but thes9 places had few mod-
ern fortifications. There wa3 a big entrenched camp at Neisse, on
the northern side of the Sudetic mountains. 1 The principal obstacle
to an advance down the Oder was the fortress of Glogau, to the north-
west of Breslau. Glogau had been a fortress for centuries, and was
partly built on an island and partly on the left bank of the Oder.
Ita fortifications were extensive, for it was an important railway
junction.' The remaining fortified positions on the line of the
Oder were Kustrin, fifty-two miles east of Berlin, the last shield
of the capital; and Stettin, near the mouth of the river. 5 It may
be said that the true defences of the eastern frontier of Germany
were provided by its incomparable system of strategic railways, which
again and again enabled von Hindenburg to concentrate large forces
quickly and secret lv at various points from which his blows were
4launched like thunderbolts. Besides Brest Litovsk, the Russians
had two very strongly fortified positions in Poland, Ivangorod, six-
ty-fcur miles southeast of Warsaw, and Novo Georgievsk at the con-
fluence of the Bug and the Vistula. 5 Warsaw, though not entirely
without defences, was practically an open town. Warsaw was the rail-
way centre o* Poland, but the fortified zone on which it relied was
created eighteen miles away at Novo Gecrgi9vsk.^ It was the usual
circle of detached forts, and was exactly 120 miles from Thorn. Fur-
ther protection was given by extensive mirshes and woods extending
1. The Times History Of The War
,
V. 3, p. 214.
2. Ibid , i p. 214-15.
3. Ibid
,, p. 215.
4. Ibid
.
,
p. 215.
5. The great War , V. 3, p. 123.
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for a long nay *rom the left bank of the Vistula. 1 As an additional
protection the Russians constructed an elaborate entrenched line be-
tween the Bzura and Warsaw. This series of entrenched positions,
which came to be known as the Blonie line, from the Village thru
2
which it passed, was about eighteen miles due west o^ Wai saw. Ivan-
gcrcd was an entrenched camp -:ixty-four miles southeast of Warsaw, at
the junction of the River Wieprz with the Vistula. It had nine forts
on the right bank and three on the le^t, and it was near Ivangorod
that vcn Hindenburg's initial attempt to seize the line of the Vis-
tula first broke down. 5 About 150 miles to the east of Warsaw, on
the River Bug, was Brest Litovsk, an immense supply depot—ringed
with fort3, which was the real base of Russian preparations in Poland,
Warsaw, Novo Georgievsk, Ivangorod, and Brest Litovsk were sometimed
described as the "Polish Quadrilateral," but Warsaw had no pretensions
4to the strength cf the other places.
1. The Times History Of Th e War
,
V. 3, p. 216.
2. Ibia
. , p. 216.
3. Ilia
, , p. 216.
4. Ibid., p. 216.
i

Charter II
The First Russian Invasion Of East Prussia.
Germany underestimated the marvelous rapidity of the Russian
mobilization. It wis commonly believed tha^ it would take at least
six or seven weeks to mobilize Russia's vast numbers. In accorarnce
with this belief, the German General Staff undertook the invasion of
Francs via Belgium, contrary to the treaty of 1839 which guaranteed
forever Belgium's neutrality. Whatever the facts of the case may be,
Germany deemed it necessary for her very existence to get at France
by the easiest route, and crush her before she was fully mobilized.^"
When France should be brought to her knees, then the whole weight of
Germany's might could be used against Russia,
As we have observed, it was the intention of the Germanic powers
to hold the Russians in check as far as possible until the fate of
Francs had been sealed. 2 In accordance with this View it was decided
to send the ^rer.ter portion of the German army to the western front,
leaving only a thin line of troops to guard East Prussia; most of
these were Landwehr and reserve formations. Austria was to invade
Russia and paralyze the available forces, it was believed that such
a movement would be facilitated by revolutionary outbreaks in Poland,
which the central powers confidently expected at the opening of the
1. It has been suggested by numerous writers that Germany would
have dene better by attacking Russia first and then France, This
would have done away withlhe famous "scrar of paper" incident, which
was universal ly condemned.
2. The Great 7ar
,
V. 3, p. 124.
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war. * However the most they could reasonably count upon was to keep
the Russians in check until France had been accounted -"or.
But the Germans were sadly disappointed in their expectations,
for the sreed with which Russia mobilized surpassed the expectations
of the outside world. The Austrian raiders were speedily repelled
2
and driven back into their own territory. Strong armies were sent
into Galicia in ord'^r to clear the southern flanks of Poland, and a
brilliant series of Pussian victories followed, which culminated in
the capture of Lemberg in September. Cracow, the goal of the Russian
ambition, was never reached, although the Russians threatened it ser-
iously.
From the very beginning Russia experienced great difficulty in
arming, drilling, ana clothing her millions. The actual mobilization
was a brilliant piece of work. Men came from all parts of the empire,
eager to give their lives for the Czar. Mr. Stephen Graham, an
American writer, was in an Altai vill-ige on the Mongolian frontier,
and relates nil at happened when the order for mobilization arrived on
July 51. The men knew nothing whatever of any trouble, and had not
even been told against whom they were going to fight. Practically
the whole male population cheerfully saddled their ponies, and made
their way to the Siberian railroad, 1200 versts away. Russian
factories worked feverishly to supply the necessary supplies and
munitions, Japan furnished huge quantities of warlike goods, and
heavy purchases were made from neutrals.
1
* Russia was particularly
handicapped by a shortage of big gun ammunition, a difficulty which
The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 217.
2. Ibia. ,p. 218.
3. Stephen Graham—Russia Ana Th e World, pp. 1-4.
4. The Times History Cf The War, V. 3, p. 219.
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soon hampered all the belligerents. However these obstacles were to
a great degree overcome, and it was calculated that by April, 1915,
Russia would be near her maximum strength.
The war brought a solidarity to the Russian nation such -s it
Just before the war,
had never known before. Never had Russia been so united, strikesA
were in progress in many Russian cities. Civil discontent was rife,
and it was commonly believed, especially by the Germans, that Russia
was on the verge of another revolution, such a3 she had experienced
At the outbreak of war,
during the Russo-Japanese War.^ the strikes at Fetrograd vanished in
a night s and the Cossacks who had been brought into the city to pre-
serve oraer in the Nevsky Prospekt and other main thoroughfares
found themselves acclaimed by the populace. One of them was heard to
say to a comrade. "13 it possible that these people are cheering us,
cr am I dreaming?"^ The Russian people clamoured for war, and When
it was known that Germany had proclaimed hostilities, immense throngs
knelt in front of the Winter Palace, and sang the Russian National
Anthem. For the first time in a century, a Tzar of Russia could
A
mingle among his subjects without a guard. In the Russo-Japanese
War some of the Russian regiments had to be driven into the troop
trains at the point of the bayonet. 5 The war of 1914 was a popular
war, and the Russian troops marched off to the rront *ith songs on
their lips.
But the most startling change was the treatment of the liquor
question. With one stroke of the pen by the Tzar, Russia became a
1. The Times History Cf The War
,
V. 3, p. 219.
2. Ipldp r. 219.
3. Ibid ., p. 219.
4. Ibid . , p. 222.
5. Ibid,,T5, 222.
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"dry" nation, first, during the period of mobilization, and later, foi
the duration of the war. 1 The imperial edict transformed the morals
of Russia, and although it cost the Russian exchequer a loss of about
%34C ,C0C,C0C, the loss cculd be easily spared, because of increased
efficiency and increase in savings. Vodka was as acceptable to the
Russian peasant a3 strawberries and cream with us. The decree was
enforced to the letter, and it was accepted without complaint. "The
result was," wrote an observer, "that the army and the people were
serious and sober when they f i.ced the task imposed upon them. Riotinc
and dissipation were things of the past, both at the front, and in th«
capital. * c Such w-s the situation in Russia at the outbreak of the
war.
Since the Russo-Japanese War, the Russians have learned valuable
lessons, and have reorganized their armies on a large scale, much
credit for this having been given to General Sukhomlinof f , some times
called the Russian Kitchener. 5 Ej.rly in 1914 it was announced that
~ 4Russia would ado r t an offensive strategy in the next European war.
This policy was followed to the letter on all the fronts. Formerly
it w^s the Russian policy to retire before the invader, who was t: be
dealt with by "Generals January and February, as Napoleon found out
to his everlasting sorrow. The Russians were aware of the f act that
1. The Times History Of The War
,
V. 3, p. 222.
2. Ibid., p. 222.
3. The London Times
,
August 25, 1914, 5 e. When the Russian rev-
olution of March, 1917, occu?. red, it was affirmed that General Sukhom-
linof f was a traitor to his country, the chirge being that he allowed
the troops to go without arms, while he reaped the profits.
4. The Ti. 33 History Of The War , V. 3, p. 223.
5. Ibid., d« 223.
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th 9 Hermans had underestimated their mobilization by at least three
weeks, and what was of mere importance, they knew that the Germans
were bent upon securing an early decision in France, and in pursuance
of that policy, had posted only small forces of troops in Ea3t Frussi;.
It was deemed advisable, therefore, to strike at the heart of Junker-
dom, and, at the same time, to relieve the pre33ure which was being
exercised upon the French by the onrushing Germans. Three railways
which cross the frontier from Russia into Ea3t Prussia determined the
general course of the Russian inversion on three converging lines, ^
The first was the grea* trunk road from Petrograd to Berlin, which
crossed the River Hiemen at the fortress of Kovno, passed the fron-
tier at Wirballen and Eyatkuhnen, and traversed the province thru
In3terbur^, Allenstein, and Eylau to Thorn. The second, and least
important of the three, left the main Vilna-Warsaw line at Bialystok,
passed the minor fortress of Oscwiec, crossed the frontier bej'ond
Grajevc, and at Lyck entered the intricate lake country, and con-
tinueu to Konigsberg. The third line ran from Warsaw to Mlawa, and
continued thru Eylau to Dantzig.^ The frontier nowhere presented
formidable obstacles, nor did the Germans take any pains to fortify
it. It wa3 a purely conventional line, which marked the political
division of the area between +he Niemen 3nd the Vistula. Nature knew
nothing of it, and on either side stretched the same flat expanses of
heath ana forest, of lake and swamp, varied by fertile fields in
which rye and potatoes were grown. ^ The intricate chains of lakes
were a formidable obstacle tc an invasion. Artificial obstacles ex-
isted only in the shape of two small forts (Bo3',en and Lyck) command-
1. The Great war , V. 3, p. 124.
2 « The Times History Of The War , v. 5, p. 224.
5. IbiJ., r. 224.
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1ing defiles among the Kasurian Lakes. Although Konigsberg was an
important fortress, it wa3 so situated that it did not interfere with
2the occupation of the greater part of the province.
Two Russian armies were sent into East Prussia along two main
routes. " The First, or Vilna Army concentrated behind the Niemen, anc
had its bases at the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno. The Second, or
Warsaw Army concentrated behind the River Narev. It detached a por-
tion of its forces to penetrate the Masurian Lakes by Bialla and Lyck,
but its main line of advance was by Mlawa-Soldau. These armies were
commanded by Generals Samsonoff and Rennenkampf.
Faul vcn Rennenkampf is perhaps one of the most competent gen-
erals in the Russian service. He distinguished himself in the Boxer
Rebellion and in the Russo-Japanese War. The Chinese called him the
"Tiger General." In the war against Japan, he was almost the only
Russian general who distinguished himself. The Japanese set a price
of 2C,CCC Roubles upon his head. The name indicates that Rennenkampf
is of German origin. Rennenkampf was bom in 1852. In 187C he join-
ed the Russian army. In 1873 he became an cfficer (he received his
training in a Junker School in Helsingfors, ) In 1895 he became a
colonel, and in 18P9 he became chief of staff of the Trans-Baikal
district. As major general he went into the Boxer Rebellion, as
cavalry general in^the Japanese war, in -vhich he would have had
greater success if the jealousy of Kurora^kin had not curtailed his
field of action. In 1913 the Tzar appointed him commanding general
1. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 224.
2. Ibid
., p. 224.
3. Ibid,, p. 225.

of the entire Vilna district ,?.hich comprised four army corps.
General Samscncff was born in 1859. He had become well known,
and like Renr.enk amp f , had made his reputation in Manchuria where he
commanded a division of Siberian Cossacks. Up to the outbreak of the
o
war, he had spent most of his time in Turkestan.
The Narev Army under General Samsonoff was the first to encount-
er a large force of the enemy, and it will be convenient to consider
its march separately, bearing in mind that it was engaged in a con-
certed _jid converging invasion, in which it was all important to se-
cure the proper timing of the move ^rom +he east with the move from
the south. It was ordered to move westward along the main railway
line connecting Fetrograd and Berlin, which penetrates the East
Prussian boundary at Eydtkuhnen. 4 It was a complete army composed of
the Second, Third, Fourth, and Twelfth Army Corps of the active army,
and the Third and Fourth Reserve Divisions, and five cavalry divi-
5
sicns. Its numerical strength must have been of about 250,000 men.
The early days of the campaign, while mobilization continued, were
n
1. This account is taken ^rom Per Volkerkrieg , V. 2, pp. 41-2.
General Rennenkampf is no longer in favor; he was removed from com-
mand by the Grand Duke Nicholas in August, 1915, for incompetence,
and went into private life. He was seen by Stanley Washburn just
before the recent revolution, and he suggested that Rennenkampf would
mcst likel}' be incarcerated or executed by the revolutionists. See
The Chicago Tribune
,
March, 25, 1917, 8 a.
2. Ibid
.
,
p. 41.
3. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 225.
4. The Great War , V. 3, p. 125.
5. Ibid ., p. 125.
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employed in cavalry raids and reconnaissances.^" The long established
popular tradition of the ruthless cruelty of the Cossacks was one of
the chief causes for the general panic and exodus of a large number
of the inhabitants at the approach of the Russian cavalry, which
scoured the country far and v/ide. The consternation and flight of the
inhabitants was not unlike the havoc occasioned by the inroads of the
Germans into Belgium at precisely the same time.
The general advance may be said to have begun on August 16, the
3
seventeenth day of the Russian mobilization. On the 17th the Rus-
N
si an van encountered the G-erman 1st (Konigsberg) Army Corps, which
fought a delaying action at Stalluponen. The Germans claim to have
4
taken 5CCC prisoners, but on the next day they retired on Gumbinnen.
Here was fought the first important battle-of this campaign. The
Russian advance covered a front of about thirty-five miles, from
Filkallen on the north to Goldap on the south. The centre followed
n
the line of the main road and railway from Stalluponen to Gumbinnen.
The ground was flat and nearly featureless, a country of rye Jid
potato fields, with scattered farmhouses, little villages, and wind-
mills. The Russian left had to clear and traverse the pine woods
which stretch for many a mile east and north of the important railway
junction of Goldap. The Russians outnumbered the Germans by at
least five to three. The main battle was fought on the 20th before
Gumbinnen. It is a picturesque country town, with many fine old
1 - The Times History Of The War
,
V. 3, p. 225.
2. The Great War
,
V. 3, p. 126.
3. The Times Hist or/ Of The War , V. 3, p. 226.
4. Borkcwski, Unssr Keiliger Krieg , V. 2, p. 190.
5. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 226.
6. Ibid.
,
p. 226.
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gabled houses, dating from the early 18th century, nhen it was colo-
nized by Austrian Frotestant refugees from Salzburg. It had 14,000
inhabitants, and was twenty-two miles distant from the Russian border.
General Rennenkampf, having a numerical superiority , attacked the ene-
my's centre with a frontal attack. The fighting was hotly contested,
and some of the trenches changed hands several times. The fighting
lasted fourteen hours, and it was only at midnight that the Germans
withdrew. The wings ,however, held out longer, and retook Pillkallen,
but they were eventually expelled by superior Russian forces. The
Russians took 400 r riscners and twelve field guns. The Germans re-
tired to Insterburg, which was an important railway centre, the junc-
tion of lines to Konigsberg, Til3it, Goldap, anu above all the key of
the vital south-western line to Allenstein and Thorn, It was i dig-
nified country town, with a fine market square, and about twice the
A
population of Gumbinnen (31,CCC. ) A notice posted in Insterburg
stated that the German troops must "obey a superior order to march
elsewhere," but told the inhabitants that the Russians could hardly
arrive within a week and counselled them to remain in their houses
5
and welcome the invaders with "hospitality." The Russians entered
Insterburg on the 24th. The Russian left wing pressed in from Goldap
to Darkehnen, and southwards to Angerburg, on the edge of the lake
country. Thence it followed the cross-country strategical railway
1. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 226.
2. Ibid
.,, p . 226.
n
5. See the German account in Per Volkerkrieg
,
V. 2, p. 36, and
Unser Heiliger Xrieg
,
V. 2, pp. 190-1. The Germans claim to have
taken 8C0C prisoners and 1C gun3.
4. The Times History 0^ The War
,
V. 3, p. 226.
5. Ibid., r. 228.
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Nordenburg-Gerdauen-Allenbur-7. On the north it held Tilsit, and the
Til sit-Koni gsberg railway as far as Labiau. The Russians never in-
vested or isolated Konigsberg, although their cavalry advanced beyond
Tariau on the railway line from Eydtkuhnen.^ The Russian prospects
were extremely good, considering that the only considerable force in
this portion of East Prussia had been defeated, and no longer ven-
tured to give battle. Moreover the retirement of General von Francois
from Insterburg had been hasty, and the road to Konig6berg was lit-
tered with quantities of abandoned material.
On August 25, General Schleideman of the 2nd Russian Army Corps
4posted up the following interesting manifesto. It reads as follows:
"We representatives of Russia, turn to you Prussians, as heralds
of the great united Slavic states, with words of reason. Stop, you
insensible ones,before it is too late'. Look about you: the whole
world is in arms against you, who are disturbing the world peace.'
Russia, France, England, Servia, Montenegro, the Belgians called
forth to defence by ycu, and even Japan—all are in arms against you,
as against wild Kuns, to defend their lands against your invasion.
Your ally Italy has forsaken you. Great suffering hangs over your
heads) The Slavic nations from the East, the united Frenchmen, Eng-
lishmen, and Belgians from the West cling around you with an iron
grasp. The German government in blind enthusiasm, deceives its own
people, whc look about them in mortal fear. Where are your victories
before Luttich? Where are your laurels against France? Where the
Russian revolution and strikes? All these are Utopias! In the 77 est
1. The Times History Of The War
,
V. 3, p. 228.
2. The Great War , V. 3, p. 127.
3. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 228.
4. Unser Heiliger Krieg
,
V. 2, pp. 191-2.
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ar.d in the East, you are losing battle upon battle. This is kept
strictly from you. All Russia rose to a man for the common Slavic
cause, and will not lay down its sword, until this fight has been
fought to the finish. We bring you future freedom for quiet, cultur-
ed and productive work; throw your useless weapons away, and don't
shed blood uselessly. The Russian is magn amines, and peace loving;
we will net take revenge for your barbarous carnage at Kalisch, and
Ezenstochen, and your oppression of the peacefully working people.
We are fighting against the German army and not against the German
people. The Pole6 living in Germany are our Slavic kinsmen. Be un-
afraid.' Your families, wives, and children, your house and heme will
net be molested by us. We suggest to the peace loving population that
they conduct themselves peacefully and offer our hand to them. Lay
down your arms, which were forced into vour hands by your government!
Surrender.' The Russians are friendly to prisoners and deal mildly
with them. A prisoner is no longer an enemy to us. We do not mas-
sacre wounded people.
Meanwhile the Narev Army had invaded East Frussia from the south-
east. This army was under the command of General Samsonoff, and its
p
total strength was about 250,000. General Samsonoff had to operate
in a much more difficult country, the region of the Masurian Lakes.
•z
Kis advance was along three lines.
(1) North-west by the Wars aw-Mlawa-Soldau railwav
(2) To Lyck by the Osowiec line, and thence by a detour south of
the larger lakes to Jchannisburg.
1. Per Vclkerkrieg
,
V. 2, pp. 43-44, which comments as follows:
"We shall see hew mild the Russian rule was. "
2. Uhssr Keiiiger Krieg
,
V. 2, p. 191.
3. The Times History Of The War, V. 3, p. 228,
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(3) To Lyck, and thence by a still wider detour above Lake Spir-
ding.
Thus the army of General Samaonoff waa apread out over a very
broad front where communication and cooreration was rendered es^eci .il-
ly difficult.
The Twentieth Army Corps and some Landwehr formations opposed the
march of the Narev Army, particularly the right wing. A aeries of
retreating battle8 now ensued, which culminated with the battle of
Frankenau. This was a hard fought battle and was wen by the numerical
superiority of the Russians. 2 The retreat of the Germans to Osterode
was hasty, and they were forced to abandon a large quantity of war
material. On the same day that Renner.kampf entered Insterburg (the
24th) Samsonoff had broken the resistance ©f the weak forces which
orrosed his progress. His cavalry swung around by Sinsburg and
Bi schof sburg , and as far as Fotfliess, a junction station on the main
line, from which a branch line ran up to Konigsberg. 3 The Russians
also occupied Allenstein, an important junction point on the main
from Berlin via Thorn to Insterburg and Eydtkuhnen. ^ General Rennen-
kampf's front was now on the line Friedland-Angerburg, and the cavalry
5
of the two Russian armies had nearly established contact. It would
not take long for the two armies, aggregating 500,0 00 men, to unite
their forces and inflict a great defeat upon Germany, which under the
circumstances ffculd be disastrous. The progress of the Russian offen-
sive, particularly the advance of the Narev army, unless immediately
1. The Great War , V. 3, p. 128.
2. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 228.
3. Ibid .
,
p. 228.
4. The Great War
,
V. 3, p. 1^9.
5. Ibid,, p. 129.
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arrested, would in a f ew day3 have cut off the army of von Francois,
isolated Konigsberg, swept the Germans from all of East Prussia east
cf the Vistula,^" and then who knows #iat might have happened to Ger-
many once the Russians were beyond the Lakes and on +he high road to
B erlin.
On Tuesday, August 25th, the day when the British forces in the
Tvest were struggling out of the trap at Maubeuge, the high-water mirk
2
of the Russian invasion of East Prussia was reached. Russian cavalry
had penetrated almost to the Lower Vistula, driving before them crowds
cf anxious refugees. The evidence appears to show that the Russian
troops behaved themselves in the towns and cities, for as a rule the
Russian officers insisted upon strict discipline. Naturally there
were transgressions by individual soldi ers^ who were executed when
3
apprehended. The German peasants, however, fled from their own ter-
ror of the Cossacks, and did not realize that the Cossacks of today
are disciplined regular troops, but remembered only wild tales of the
ragged spearmen who had ridden thru their land a hundred years ago,
and had made little distinction between German allies and French
4
opponents. With stories of universal buminsrs and slaughters, the
peasants and gentry alike fled. over the Vistula, and brought news to
Berlin that East Prussia was in the grip of the invader.
It was not until after the defeat at Gumbinnen that the Germans
began to take the danger to East Prussia seriously. They were ab-
1. The Great War , V. 3, p. 124.
2. Kelson's History 0^ The War , V. 2, p. 108.
3. See Per Volkerkrieg , V. 2, pp. 44-48, for an interesting
account cf the Russian occupation of East Prussian cities.
4. Kelson ' s History Of The War
,
V. 2, p. 108.
5. Ibid, , pp. 108-110.
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sorbed in their offensive in France, and had left onlv five corrs
the active army (the 1st, Xth, 17th, 5th, and 6th) to operate on the
entire Eastern Front, and of these the Sth (Breslau) was sent to help
the hard pressed Austrians in Galicia, and only two, the 1st and
20th) were at this moment available in East Prussia. By August 22d
the 3ens an Staff had become convinced that drastic measures were re-
quired to cope with the alarming situation in East Prussia. A dis-
patch from the Kaiser summoned General von Hindenburg to take command
is the East, a man sixty-seven years of age, who was as little known
in his own country as many other commanders who have great distinctior
in thi3 Great War. On Sunday, the 23d, von Hindenburg reached his
headquarters at Marienburg, a fortress town near the Vistula, on the
extreme edge of the invaded province. He 'arrived ^flien the German
fortunes were at their lowest ebb, and the story of how within a week
he turned the tide and achieved one of the most decisive victories in
this war makes a brilliant page even in the rich military history of
3Germany.
Paul vcn Hindenburg (Paul Ludwig Hans Anton von Beneckendorff
una vcn Hindenburg) was born in Posen in 1847. He came of a typical
Frussian family, and for two centuries his ancestors had served the
State, as officers and officials. Their estate was at Neudeck in
West Frussia, on the edge of the very province which he was called
upon to save, 4 The traditions of the family are described in an
engaging bic?rajhy by the General' 3 younger brother. They were based
on that curious amalgam of piety, loyalty, and militarism which -vas
1. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 231.
2. The Great War , V. 3, p. 129.
3. The Times History Of The W ar, V. 3, p. 231.
4. Ibid, ,p. 231.

the moral foundation of the Prussian "Junker Class." 1 Von Hindenburg
began his career as a lieutenant at Sudowa, where he received a
sli£it wound. He took part in the battles of St. Privat and Sedan
and in the operations before Paris in 1870. Later he attended the
i
war academy. While serving on the sta -^ of a division at Konigsberg
during the years 1881-1883 he became fascinated with the problem of
turning the Masurian Lakes into a bulwark for the defence of East
Prussia against a possible Russian invasion. This subject became
at once his occupation and his pastime. He was obsessed by it. He
explored every nook and corner of this bewildering region. Later,
when called to the General Staff and to the professorship of applied
tactics in the War Academy, von Hindenburg had an excellent opportun-
ity to develop his favorite theme in the course of his lectures.
Some of his colleagues regarded his apparent infatuation with good-
natured ridicule.^
The Munich Neueste Nachrich x en gives the following interesting
outline cf Hindenburg in his life work.^
"Tvro opposing views have been held for decades past in military
circles on the subject of the marshy region which includes the
Masurian Lakes. One was that of General Hindenburg, that the Rus-
sians mu3t be forced into the lakes. The other was that the Russians
must be kept away from them at all costs. The majority was against
Hindenburg, who, however, clung obstinately to the 'mistake of his
life. 1 Hindenburg was in command of a corps in the provinces when
he heard that the idea had been mooted for the drainage and cultiva-
1 « The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 231.
2. The Sreat War , V. 3, p. 129.
3. Ibid., pp. 129-30,
4. Quoted from The Literary Digest, November 14, 1914, pp. 948-9
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tion of these invaluable marshes.
"The eld General hastened to Berlin where he explained, protest-
ed, and agitated* When his cause seemed hopeless, he went to the
Bnpexor. There he pleaded so effectively that his Majesty promised
that hie lakes should not be touched. Each year Hindenburg was sent
to maneuvers, in the district where the lakes lay. There, as at all
maneuvers, the soldiers of one array had a white ribbon in their caps
and the other army had a red one. The red3 were the Russians, and the
whites, always commanded by Hindenburg, had to defend East Prussia.
When the reds knew they were going to fight Hindenburg, they 8 aid,
until the saying became proverbial, 'today we shall have a bath.' They
knew thit everything they could do was unavailing, the end was always
the same: Hindenburg entangled them hopelessly in the Masurian Lakes.
This was repeated year by year. With the signal to break off the
maneuvers the red army was invariably standing up to its neck in watei,
"Then the General was pensioned. (1911) He spent all his summer
holidays among the lakes. He borrowed from Konig3berg a gun with its
normal gun carriage, and had it dragged, from morning to night, out
of one pool into another. He measured how deeply a cannon of a cer-
tain size sank in +he mire; he ascertained how many horses W3re re-
quired to drag a cannon over fairly solid ground, and discovered
swamps out of which not even twenty horse6 could extricate a gun. He
noted, he measured, he calculated, he drew plans. The rest is known."
Ke scon became the idol of Germany, but there were many whe thought
that a greater general than Hindenburg was the brilliant Chief of
Staff, General ven Ludendorff.
Ludendorff is Germany's man of mystery, the grim, inscrutable,
silent man whose picture is on sale in every shop, #icse name is in
svery mouth, but whese personality is hidden even from his own
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ccunt rymen.
Ludendorff is Hindenburg' s indispensable right-hand man. When
lindenburg took command of the Eastern front in raid-August, 1914,
Ludendorff was rushed from Li ece to Hindenburg's headquarters on the
p
eastern frontier. Since then the two have become inseparable. There
are those who say that Ludendorff is Hinaenburg' s brain, and that
Hindenburg's greatest successes have been planned by his silent, re-
tiring assistant. Hindenburg, when in the mood, becomes very talka-
tive and chatty, and at such times he often attributes his succes to
his assistant. 2 There is perfect harmony between them; Ludendorff
plans and Hindenburg decides.
Ludendorff as a strategist was a disciple of Count Schlieffen,
whose motto was, "Annihilate the enemy." 4 He also sympathizes with
his chief, Hindenburg. "You can't make war sentimentally," says
Hindenburg. "The more mercilessly you make war, the more merciful
you are in reality, for so you end the war the sooner. The most
lumane method of waging war is' and remains that which brings peace
5
most quickly. " Evidently Hindenburg is in accord with the German
War-Book which declares that the provisions of the Hague convention
l»
tt
If
are nothing but "Sentimentalitat und weicheler Gefuhlsschwarmerei,
"
or lr other words, to carry on war in a humane manner would be but
flabb'^ emotionalism.
Outside of Germany the fame has been Hindenburg's, at home his
1. Swope, Herbert Bayard, Inside The German Empire, 1916 , p. 210.
2. Ibid
. ,p. 210.
3. Ibid
. ,p» 211.
4. Ibia
. ,p. 220.
5. Ibid. , p. 220.
6. Morgan, The German War Book
, p. 7.

ia the name which commands the applause of the crowds; but these who
knew do net speak of one without the other. WH In ienburc; and Luden-
dcrf f , " they say. No man knows what share of the glory belongs to
the silent, hard-working strategist who pores over the mars and or-
ders by day and night and what share to the big man of action. 1
The strategical problem that confronted Hindenburg was, with
very limited forces, and those largely composed of second line forma-
tions, to beat two armies which had nearly united, each of them equal
to hi 8 own numbers. Unless Hindenburg coula defeat each army in
detail before they were united, the Russians would be in a position
to defeat any attempt that Hindenburg had in mind. He proceeded with-
out delay to concentrate all the available German forces scattered
thruout this region. An uninterrupted procession of troop trains
day and night taxed the capacity of the main line -from Thorn to
Ost erode, as far as the railway could be safely operated under Ger-
man control. Hindenburg' s available resources in men were very
limited. The 1st and 2Cth Arm^ Corps were reinforced from the neigh-
boring fortresses, and in all Hindenburg was able to scrape up an
4
army of about 14C,CC0. Hindenburg had to work qui ckly,for every
moment was precicus, since if Rennenkampf should unite hi3 forces
with those of Ms colleague, the Germans might suffer an appalling
disaster. Just at this time the dash upon Paris was entering upon
its final stage, and the withdrawal of large forces from the Western
1. Swope, Inside The German Empire 1916 , p. 224.
2. The Times History Cf The War , V. 3, p. 233.
5. The Great War , V. 3, p. 131.
4. Unser Heiliger Krieg , V. 2, p. 196. The London Times esti-
mates Hindenburg 1 s army at 160, COC men.
5. The Great War, V. 3, p, 131.
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Theatre, which wovld have been abaolutely indispensable if the Ger-
aans had suffered an overwhelming defeat in the East, would have been
fatal to their whole campaign.^" Everything depended upon the chances
fcr victory in East Prussia and upon the skill of a single man.
A theory grew up that Hindenburg drew his army largely from the
Western Front, and the estimates of the number of corrs which were
sent to him from Belgium rose steadily **rom one to five or even seven.
These corps were never named or identified. The theory was based on
the statement, definitely made and published at the time, that on Fri-
day ni^it, the 28th, German troop6 w^re seen entraining in Belgium
for the East. At that moment Tannenterg was virtually won. If these
reinforcements (whatever their extent/ were destined for East Prussia,
rather than Galicia or Poland, they must have arrived at a later
stage, when the Germans had already crossed the Russian frontier. The
probabilities are heavily against this theory.
Hindenburg handled his tactical problem as skilfully as he had
conceived his broad strategical plan. The Russians were overconfi-
dent, and because of their recent successes against an inferior force,
they became careless and scattered their forces. Samsonoff, misled
by his success, conceived an ambitous scheme. Pressing on towards
Allenstein, he decided to continue hi3 advance thru the western lake
region, and seize the crossings of the Vistula, his chief objective
being, apparently, the second-class fortress of Graudenz between
Dantzig and Thorn. ^ His right was directed upon Ost erode, while his
1. The Great War , V. 3, p. 131.
2. The Tines History Of The War , V. 3, p. 233.
3. Ibid ., p. 233. The German reports do not mention any rein-
forcements from the Western frontier.
4. Kelson's History Of The War
,
V. 2, p. 115.

left was farther south along the railway from Soldau to Ortelsburg.
The nature of the ground made his advance strategically dangerous,
inasmuch as he was conrelled to move on a broad front, 3ince the roade
running between the lakes and the swamp s made it impossible to deploy
large bodies of men on a sinqle line of march. His columns were thus
temporarily divided from each other, but he evidently considered that
each of them was strong enough to rush aside any force that was like-
p
ly to impede its progress.
Samscnoff made the mistake of his life when he failed to occupy
the good road from Ost erode to Soldau, and what was more important,
the two railways which fed Scldau from Eylau, Graudenz, and Thorn.
Hindenburg'3 first step was to occupy this road (much of it concealed
by forest) and to make himself master of Soldau junction. This line
was gained on Wednesday, the 26th, only three days after Hindenburg
Shad as sum ed the command.
Von Hindenburg' s defeat Samsonoff recalls very plainly the
crushing of the Roman army on the plain of Cannae in 216 B. C. which
i
afterward became proverbial. To Professor Hans Delbruck is due the
clearest and most consistent analysis of this very famous battle of
antiquity, and on the basis of his able interpretation, Count von
Schlieffer, formerly Chief of the German General Staff, once declared
that Cannae was the prototype of the kind of plan which should be the
•ideal for the modern commander. We may assume, therefore, that Frc-
fessor Delbruck' s explanation of the Battle of Cannae was current in
hi gher military circles in Germany. 4
1. Nelson's History Of The War , V. 2, p. 115.
2. Ibid . ,p. 115.
3. The Times History Of Th e War, V. 3, p. 234.
4. Quoted from The Great War , V. 3, pp. 132-133.
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Both the Battle of Cannae and the notable contest which will
presently be described were victories of niinbleness and dexterity
against stolid, unintelligent foes. In each case the more talented
comnander enveloped and hopelessly ensnared his opponent. Hannibal
led 50,000 men against the 70,000 Romans. The Germans claim to h^ve
won the no less complete victory in East Prussia against similar odds
while the Russians assert that the Germans were numerically superior.
Although, the Russians were numerically superior, yet they were scat-
tered, while Hindenburg could maintain a local superiority by means
of his strategic railways. At Cannae, Hannibal drew up his inferior
troops in the center of the battle-line, and placed the dependable
troops of his army in compact array on the wings which overlapped the
Roman front. The weaker Carthaginian center received the shock of
the Roman onslaught and yielded ground before it, but without break-
ing, until the wings were in position on the Roman flanks. Then,
when the squadrons of Numidian cavalry had enclosed the Roman rear,
the essential maneuvers were accomplished. The Romans were complete-
ly surrounded,A comp ressed into a congested position, where they were
unable to deploy and make their numbers count. The closer they were
crowded together the mere unwieldy became their efforts and the more
deadly the action of the enemy. What followed was not a battle, it
p
was simply a slaughter.'
It seems that Hindenburg employed somewhat the same tactics as
the victor of Cannae, the double turning movement for the envelop e-
1. The Great War , V. 3, p. 133.
2. Quoted from The Great War
,
V. 3, p. 133-134. See also Nie-
m en, Hindenburg* s Siege bei Tannenberg and Angerburg . \ good de-
scription of the battle of Cannae is given by Herr Niemen, who like-
wise ccmr,are3 the battle of Tannenberg to Cannae.
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ment, and then the destruction of his opponent. The natural condi-
tions and means at his disposal permitted Hindenburg to economize in
the use of his force, as compared with Hannibal, in two very impor-
tant respects. The almost impenetrable character of the territory in
the rear of the Russians served as effectually as the Numidian caval-
ry to complete the hostile ring, while the excellent railway communi-
cations across the rear of his own position enabled Hindenburg to
shift his forces quickly and secretly and thus use the same troops
successively for the culminating operations of the conflict in dif-
ferent parte of the field.
Strong German forces were advanced from the north on the line
Allenstein, Wartenburg, and Bischof sburg--which succeeded in advanc-
ing their left wing past Passenheim, so that the Russians, after
bitter fighting, were forced out of their positions to the south-east
into the Masurian swamps and lakes. 7/ith the enormous stretch of
varying surroundings, now forest, now lake, and between them meadows
and fields, a consolidated front could not be maintained. It even
2happened that parts of the Russian army fought with each other.
The most important operation in the whole battle was the sur-
rounding of the left wing of the Russians and the forcing of it away
from the border. This task fell to the 1st Army Corps which formed
the German right wing. An official report gives the following accounl
Of the part that the 1st Army Corps played in the battle of Tannen-
berg: "The 1st Army Corps was called from the battlefield of Gum-
binnen to lead the decisive blow against the left flank and rear of
the Russian army which was advancing from tie Narev, The soldiers
1. The Great War
,
V. 3, p. 135.
2 * Cer Volkerkrieg , V. 2, p. 50.
3. Ibid.
,
p. 50.

had to be started on the night march as soon as they arrived by train.
After a strenuous march the corps established contact with the ad-
vance guard of the enemy on August 26--a sultry late summer day--and
kept forcing them back to the east until night fall.
"The next day the decisive fighting was to be done in the large
battle which had been given the name of Tannenberg. At Wessolowen
and Usdau (south of Gilgsnburg) the 1st Russian army corps, which was
being continually reinforced by parts of the Warsaw guard division by
way of Soldau, obstructed the way to fte re.ir of the hostile army.
The ene:.:y had entrenched himself strongly in a favorable position.
By hard, bloody, forest battles the right wing of the corps gained
step by step in the vincity of Wessolowen. At 11 A. M. the village
of Usdau was taken by stcrm, and its garrison the old Russian regi-
ment from Wiborg was taken after a brave resistance. With heavy
losses the enemy retreated towards Soldau in the direction of Keiden-
burg. Thus the flank of the ftarev Army w?.s subjected to the annihi-
lating advance cf the 1st Army Corps.
On the 28th of August apart of the 1st Army Corps followed the
retreating enemy to Soldau, while the remainder began the ruthless
pursuit which blocked the wav of the main Narev army to Poland. The
corps pressed forward thru Neidenburg along the great highwavs to
Willenburg, although it encountered fierce resistance, especially in
the forests. On the morning of August 30, the mighty ring .around the
213th, 15th, and 23d Russian army corps had just been formed. Dis-
tributing their heavy rnms as they chose, the Germans poured their
shells into the congested masses of Russians who were floundering
1. Quoted from Per Volkerkrieg , V. 2, pp. 50-53.
2. Ibid., 53.
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hopelessly in the swamps or staggering confusedly thru the forests. 1
It seems at first sight incredible that anything but a very
superior army could surround another so effectively. 2 The achieve-
ment is, however, by no means impossible in these conditions even with
a numerically inferior force. Hindenburg was able, as it were, to
multiply his *orces, partly by his foresight in providing motor trans-
pert, and pirtly by his skill in maneuvering to secure the road3.
His L.inute knowledge of the topography of the district enabled him,
moreover, 30 to utilize the swamps and lakes that he need hold only
the solid intervals between them; while the unlucky Russians, ignor-
ant of the country, lost entire batteries in the marshes, and were
drowned j:s often as they were shot. 4 By the 30th, whole battalions
and even regiments were laying down their arms, and the only question
wa3 how m my c r uld escape by the only road left open to them, via
5Ortelsburg and Johannisburg. On the 31st, in a last effort to rally
his men and organize the retreat, Samsono^f, who had borne himself
amidst the disaster with steadfast gallantry, rede with his Sta^^
into a fire swept zone. ttMy place is with ray men," was his answer to
remonstrances. He was examining a map, when a shell burst in the
mid3t of his Staf-f. It killed him on the spot, and with him General
1. The Great War
,
V. 3, p. 138.
2. The Time3 History 0* The War
,
V. 3, p. 235.
3. Ibid
., p. 235.
4. Ibid
. , p. 235.
5. Ibid., p. 235. See Per Volkerkrieg , V, 2, pp. 53-56. An
eye witness states that as many as 20,000 Russians surrendered in
one place.
6. Ibid., p. 236.
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Pestitch, his Chief cf Stiff, and several junior officers. 1 Sanison-
c^'s personal refutation suffered nothing in this defeat, and Rus-
sian opinion inclined rather to blame hia colleague, General Zhilin-
sky, for the disaster. * General Martoa,
.
a corps commander, waa car-
3tured as he sought to escape from the field o^ battle.
Cn the 29th the German Staff issued the following short report:
"Our troops in East Frusaia under the command of Colonel General
Hindenburg have defeated, a^ter three days fighting near Tannenberg,
it
Hohenstein and Ortelsburg, the Russian Narev Army, consisting of five
army corps and three cavalry division, and are now purauing it
4
across the borders.
"
Cn the next day, the 30th, von Hindenburg waa given the chief
command in the East, and waa presented with* the Iron Croas of the
firat claaa by the Kaiaer.
The German3 claim to have taken 90,CC0 unwounded prisoners, and
50 9 000 wounded prisoners, besides 400 guns and an enormous amount of
equipment of all kinds. They estimate the number of Russian deid at
about 40,000, and their own losses at about 10,000—15,000. If
their claims be correct, only about 70,000 out cf 250,000 Russians
escaped that awful carnage.
The Germans have chosen to call this memorable contest the
Eattle cf Tannenberg for purely historic reasons. East Frussia had
always been the cradle and stronghold of the Prussian autocracy.
1. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 236.
2. Ibid , ,p. 236.
3. See Lindenburg, G-egen Die Ru s sian , p. 44.
4
-
Per vfllke rkrieg
,
V. 2, p. 36.
5. Ibidp p. 36.
6. Nieraan, Hindenburg's Siege bei Tannenberg und Angerburg,p. 17
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Conseioiently their pride received an awful blow, when their Champions,
the Order of the Teutonic Knights, were defeated by the united SIare
in the gre it battle of Tannenberg on July 15, 1410. 1 The conflict
remains a landmark in the eternal struggle of Teuton and Slav. It
fills a prominent though mournful page in Grerman history. When Frince
n
Eulow, in his retirement, wrote his famous book on "Imperial Ger-
many, n he could still re'er with regret to the "black day of Tannen-
berg. Therefore the news of Hindenburg's triumph seemed to e rf-ice
a bitter memor;', and to compensate for the grief of 500 years. 5
As soon as von Hindenburg had disposed of Samsonoff's Army, he
hurried forward, scarcely allowing his soldiers anv respite, for the
purpose of dealing with Fermenkampf 1 s Army. Instead of pushing for-
ward or hastening to unite ?.'ith Samsonoff, "Rennenkampf
,
grown suaaen-
ly cautious, had begun to intrench himself on a line running from
Lake Mauer to Tapiau, where his army faced in the direction whence
4Hindenburg's attack was naturally ejected. The Vilna Army, drawn
up in a generally concentric position covering the entire north-east-
ern part of the province, presented far too extensive a front for the
immediate application of the surreme double turning maneuver. 5
Hindenburg hoped to turn the Russian left wing, and repeat his Tannen-
6berg tactics.
On the anniversary of Sedan day (September 2) Hindenburg issued
the following order to the troops. "Soldiers of the 8th Army! The
1. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 205.
2. Ibid., p. 205.
3. Ibid,, p. 207.
4'. The i reat War
,
V. 3, p. 141.
5. Ibid., p. 141.
6. Niem^r., Hindenburg's Siege bei Tannenberg und Anger>>urg,r . 18
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uany days of strenuous battle cn the wide fields between Allenstein
and Neidenburg are over. You have won a crushing victory ever five
amy corps and three cavalry divisions. More than 60,000 r-risoners
ar.d innumerable guns, machine guns, several standards, and a are it
deal cf war material
_re in our hands. The remnants of the ccmuere
army are fleeing over the border. The Vilna Arrav has begun the re-
treat 'rom Kcnigsberg. Next to Sod this glittering succes is due to
your joy, and sacrifice, unexcelled endurance, and bravery. I hope
to be able to give you a ^ew dav3 of earned rest. Then we will go
forth with fresh energy. With God, for Kaiser, King and Fatherland,
until the last Russian has le^t our precious, sorely tried provinces
and we have carriea the ever victorious banners into the enemy'
3
country! Long live his Majesty the Kai3er and Kins! h1
Hindenburg, however, did not pause for rest or reorganization.
He triea to get at Rennenkampf 1 s rear and intercept his retreat, but
the maneuver failed. However Rennenkampf narrowly escaped Samsonoff
fate. While the Narev Army was wasting awav in the iron grasp of
Hindenburg, Rennenkampf with his army sat quietly in Inst erburg--for
almost three weeks, arparentlv without concerning himself about
Samscnc**, certainly without hurrying to his assistance, although
Rennenkampf 1 s position was becoming more and more precarious. Max
Behrmann, the war reporter of the "Frankfurter Zeitung", writes.
"What cculd cause Rennenkampf to avoid +he few days marching that
separated his trcops from those o* Samsonoff? It is generally be-
lieved that Rennenkampf considered Samsonoff *s troops sufficiently
strong to defy Hindenburg. Rennenkampf should have assumed however,
!• Per Volkorkrieg , V. 2, p. 37.
2. Ibid. , P. 53.
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that a tinely reinforcement to Samsonoff would have been a welcome
adaition to hie forces. But it might not be military but personal
motives which caused Rennenkampf to watch quietly while Samsonoff was
bleeding to death. These rossible motives c-n be rightly understood
only by one who knows Russia and Russian military conditions. Samson-
off s laurels—if one may speak of such at all—were already disturb-
ing Rennenkamrf * s peaca of mind in the Manchurian campaign: Samson-
off was undoubtably one of the very few truly gifted and seriously
Russian leaders, while Rennenkampf was and remained merely a general
cf cavalry. But an uncontrollable ambition rules this man, and so
he could by no means be indifferent as to whether or how Samsonoff
would get on. I am convinced that the commander of the Vilna army
received the report of Samsonoff s destruction with a crim smile." 1
Of course it is also possible that Rennenkamrf really underestimated
the strength of Samsonoff s foe, and regarded the battles merely as
a continuation of the skirmishes on the retreat.
Rennenkamrf s position at the beginning o f the battle was as
follows: His right wing stood in the vicinityof Allenburg, the left
extended along the Masurian Lakes at Angerburg, while the lanest
mass of troops wa3 formea in the protruding obtuse angle at Gerdauen.
Informed bv excellent air service of this situation, the Germans sent
a strong force against Serdauen, and at the same time, the whole for-
1. This report should not be taken too seriously. Cf course
Rennenkamrf may have had personal motives for not coming to the aid
of his sorely-pressed colleague; yet the statement must be viewed
critically until further proof is to be had. It must be remembered
that Rennenkampf was removed -"rom active command by Duke Niohol ts in
August, 1914, for incompetence, and has been lookedupon with disfavor
by the revolutionists of March, 1917.
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ward line was attacked. Simultaneously German cavalry and other
troops went thru between the lakes, and surrounded the left wing of
the enemy. Thus Rennenkampf became aware that his left wing, which
he deemed completely protected by the lakes, was in danger of being
cut off. And, since in the meantime, his front positions were shat-
tered, he decided to retreat along the onlv rossible line, that of
Insterburg-Gurabinnen-St alluponen. 1
In a war report on the last battles in East Fru3sia, the "Ber-
liner Lokalanzeiger" says: "The Russians withdrew in two divisions
across the borders of the province, the main troops hurrying toward
the north, and smaller parties toward the east. The Russian right
wing, which had begun to retreat in time, seems to have kept fairly
good order, but the left ting, according to ill reports, showed the
character of a disorderly flight. Major General Ludendorff strained
2to the last breath every man and horse in pursuit."
On September 15, Hindenburg issued the following order to his
troops: "Soldiers of the Eighth Army! You h we won new laurels for
your banners. In a two days battle on the Masurian Lakes, in a pur-
suit lasting several days thru Litau far across the Russian border,
you have not only defeated, but annihilate^the last of the t^o hos-
tile armies that had invaded East Frussi a, --the Vilna Armv composed
of the 2d, 3d, 4th, 2Cth, and 22th corps, the 1st, and 5th artillery
brigades, the 52d, 54th, 56th, 57th, 72d, and 76th reserve divisions,
1. Quoted 'rom Per Volkerkrieg
,
V. 2, pp. 53-55. See also Nie-
man, Hindenburg 's Siege cei Tannenberg und Angerburg
, pp. 19-21.
2. Ibid . , p. 57. Thi e report also states that the Grand Duk s
Kicholas and Rennenkampf escaped in civilian attire. It is haraly
plausible that the Grand Duke was in East Frussia, when he was con-
ducting the victorious Galician operations.

Note 4 continued.
will be compelled to encounter an antagonist strengthened and render-
ed w" ser by the experience of preceding battles. On the banks c^ the
pieman and the Rhine is the tomb of presumptuous military Germanism.
With these words, let us ho-^e, will begin a new page in the history
of the cultured German nation."
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and the 1st and 2d cavalry brigades. So far several 3tand?^rd3, about
30,00C unbounded prisoners, at least 15C c^uns, many machine jiane,
munition trains and countless vehicles have been collected on the
extensive battlefields. This is to be accredited to your zealous
fighting, your unparailed endurance in marching, and your bravery.
Give God the honor.' He will also be with us in the future. Long
live his Majesty the King.'" 1
East Prussia was now entirely cleared of the enemy and the Ger-
mans advanced into Russian territory, occupying Suwalki, where they
2 n
set up a German administration. The president of Mun3ter, Count vcn
Meervelde was appointed as the chie^ civilian authority over the con-
cruered portion of East Frussia. General von Morgan issued the fol-
lowing proclamation in Poland. "To the inhabitants of Lomza and
Warsaw.' The Feus si an Narev Army has been destroyed and the Vilna Army
under General Rennenkampf is in retreat; the Austro -Hungarian Armies
are advancing victoriously from Galicia, the French and English have
been decisively defeated in France, and Belgium has come under German
rule. I come with my corps as a forerunner of other German armies
and as a friend to ycu.' Rise up with me and help drive the Russian
barbarians who enslaved you out of your beautiful land, which shall
1. Per Volkerkrieg
,
V. 2, pp. 38-39. In a captured gun carri-
age was found a hundred pieces of newly coined copper coins, which
had the picture of the Czar on one side, and on the other the in-
scription (Einzug in Berlin 1914), The report continues and states
that the Russians were so confident that a flag day was decreed by
the Czar in Petrcgrad, and the proceeds, amounting to 50,0C0 roubles,
were to be given to the first Russian soldier who should reach Berlin
2. The Great W^r , V. 3, p. 143.
3. Per Volkerkrieg
,
V. 2, p. 71.
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again receive its political and religious liberty. That is the will
of my mighty and gracious Emperor. My troops have been instructed to
treat you as friends. Xe will pay for what you furnish us. I expect
that you will receive us like allies." 1 The Gentian control of the
city of Suwalki and the province began immediately in an energetic
manner. The firemen served as policemen, and a provisional city
government of citizens was established. The value of the rouble was
established at one mark, forty pfennigs, and the payment of all pri-
vate property was guaranteed. 2
General von Hindenburg achieved a brilliant victory, thou ah his
underestimation of the enemy was destined to C03t him dear. The
obscure, retired soldier had become in a short three weeks the idol
of the German people, and the Kaiser confirmed their estimate by mak-
ing him a Field Marshal and entrusting him with the supreme command
of all the German forces in the East. 5
The dashing Russian invasion of East Prussia had failed, and had
cost the loss of an army. It is probably a mistake to suppose that
1. Per Vclkerkrieg
,
V. 2, p. 71.
2. Ibid
. , pp. 71-72.
3. The Times History Of The War, V. 3, p. 257.
4. Quoted from The London Times
,
September 28, 1914, 7 b. Th
e
Army Messenger
,
in an article headed, "From The Seine To Meme n, "
comments on the Russian retreat from East Prussia. It says: "Our
advance in East Prussia was only a demonstration. It is necessary
to rem ember this. True it cost us pretty dear, but our ^oes did not
escape any r..cre cheaply. From the enemy's allied forces has been
withdrawn a strength which, who knoWs^mi ght have cleared the road for
the German Kaiser's dinner at Paris. With thinned ranks it is now
necessary for the Germans to begin over again. More than that, they

-46-
it caused any direct and immediate transference of troops from France
to East Prussia. But without a doubt it did indi recti v contribute
to relieve the pressure on the Western front. It demonstrated the
power of the Russians to assume an early offensive and 'orced the Ger-
mans to provide against its renewal. It led the Germans to regard
the whole Eastern front with a new anxiety and interest. It was a
starting point in adventure after adventure, in which they hurled
their forces on Warsaw, wasting their resources in the process. "It
was a shrewd blow from the l#ft against a boxer whose whole attention
had been directed to his right. It forced him at length to direct
his energies to both fronts, and to meet the offensive by a counter-
offensive. It was at once a challenge and a temptation, ni
The sequel of Hindenburg' s East Pru33ian campaign was destined
to tarnish his glory, and restore the prestige of the Russian Arr..ies.
Hindenburg, who believed that Rennenkampf ' s big army had "not merely
been defeated, but shattered," left the actual conduct of operations
2tc General von Morgan, who had served under him at Tannenberg.
Renr.enk ampf
,
however, saved the greater portion of his army, and
reached the circle of fortresses of Kovno, Grodno and Bjalostck,
where it was completed by reserve formations. Men and war materials
were both lacking for an energetic German invasion against the forti-
fied Narev-Bug lines. Nevertheless in order to protect East Prussia
from further outrages of war, it was necessary to proceed against the
fortress of Osowicc, which controlled the shortest road to Lyck.
The Vilna Army was reorganized behind the fortresses on the
Karev, and was a^ain very formidable. It had moreover, gained in
1. Quoted 'rom The Times History 0* The War , V. 3, p. 257.
2. Ibid., p. 237.
3. Per vclkerkrieg
,
V. 2, p, 2C5.
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leadership, for General Ruszky, the victor of Lemberg, a brilliant
scientific soldier, had been detached to command the defence. 1 The
Germans ?;ere now at a disadvantage, for they no longer had their
strategic railways at their disposal. The Germans discovered to thei]
dismay, that only a few of the better main roads were practicable for
their heavy motor transport. Most of the roads were nothing but
beaten tracks, which had never been macadamized, and became in a wet
autumn impassable sloughs of heavy mud. 2 To add to the misfortunes
cf the invaders, it rained heavily for three days, from September 27-
30, the critical period of the fighting.
The war correspondent cf the "Berliner Tageblatt" writes about
these battles as follows:- "Cur troops are in continual motion and
6uffer from bad weather and privations. Nothing would be more er-
roneous than to believe that we are penetrating deep into Russia with
hurra and huzra, driving the enemy before us, until we make ourselves
at home in St. Fetersburg and Warsaw. On the contrary, it is rossibl i,
yes probable, that here and there we must turn back from the cour-
ageous and successful offensive to defensive positions, until we also
receive reinforcements, aid are able to fill the gars made by the
month -long battles 1
Th e Russian defences were f orL9d primarily by twc rivers, the
Nien.en and the Bobr. The latter is an inconsiderable stream, and of
no great width, but it is twelve feet deep, and it runs thru a
5
Bwaapy valley of immense and impassable marshes. Across these
1. The Tir.es History Of The War , V. 3, p. 237.
2. Ibid., p. 237.
3. Ibid., p. 238.
4. Per Vfllkerkrieg , V. 2, p. 205.
5. The Times History Of The War, V. 3, p. 238,
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marshes there is only on© good passage, the high road and railway
from Lyck thru Grajewc to Bialystok. The crossing is defended by the
little town of Osowice, which ranks as a third class fortress. 1 It
has solid concrete forts, and these were provided at the outbreak of
war, with a new type of heavy a;un, whose r erformance surprised the
Germans, The bombardment began on September 27, and lasted for four
days, but little damage was done to the solid walls. The seventeen
inch howitzers made their usual appearance in the newspaper accounts
of these operations, but the probability is that the largest guns
usee* were the more generally serviceable Austrian piece?, on motor
carriages. The guns were pushed up to within five miles of the fort-
ress, and the infantry lines were never nearer than four miles. The
last episode o^ the siege was a brilliant "sortie by the garrison.
Bodies of infantry, by following paths over the swamps known only to
inhabitants, contrived to get behind the advanced German lines, both
from left and right. Another body charged up the causeway, and be-
fore the Germans had recovered from their surprise, contrived to
capture three guns while the rest went hurridly northwards. The
Germans seeing the hopelessness of taking Dscwice, discontinued the
A4
siege on October 1. It was abandoned not merely because Osowice
had proved to be unexpectedly obstinate, but also because the larger
German operations against the Niemen had meanwhile failed even more
5h op elessly. c
The object of the Germans was to cross the Niemen and cut the
1 - The Times History C* The War , V. 3, p. 238.
2. Ibid ., p. 236.
3. Ibid
., p. 238.
4. Per Volkerkrieg , V. 2, p. 205.
5. The Times History Of The War, V. 3, p. 238.
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Russian line of communications. The object o r General Ruszky was
not merely to rerel them from the Niemen, but to drive them back to
their own frontier, and to disorganize their communications by seiz-
ing the little town of Augustowc, a place of no intrinsic importance,
but vital because it is the point at which several of the few good
roads of this region cross. 1 The chief physical feature of this
region is the immense forest, thirty miles long, and twenty miles
wide, on whose western edge Augustowo is situated. Intricate chains
cf lakes stretch on either side of the road ^rom Suwalki to Seiny,
begin again south-east 0* Seiny, ana are *ound on either side of the
p
road from Surinc to the Niemen. This country reminds one of the
Masurian lake region. Above all, the Niemen itself is a formidable
ccstacle. It is more than 20C yards wide;" it is too deep to ford,
and bridges exist only at Grodno and Olita, both of these being forti-
fied r laces. The defence had a further advantage. The right bank,
which the Russians held, was high, and in some places might almost
be called a cliff. The left bank, on which the Germans had to
operate, was lew, and, wa at was worse, it was swampy in most places.^
The attemxt to cross the Niemen was made simultaneously at two
point 3. The most northern of these was at Druskeniki, about twenty-
seven miles north of Grodno. Here the Germans constructed a pontoon
bridge and endeavored to cross the river. The Russians held their
fire until the bridge was full of men. 5 Then it was swert cle^n by
the artillery. The German guns opened fire, and a long artillery
1. The Times History Cf The Tar , V. 3, p. 238.
2. Ibia ^ p. 239.
3. Ibid. ,p. 239.
4. Ibid
., p. 239.
5. Ibid., p. 239.
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duel ensued. Thinking that the Russian guns were 3ilenced, the Ger-
man infantry again crowded over the bridge. They met the same fate
as their predecessors, and it wa3 s.dd that thousands of German
corpses floated down the stream.^" The other attempt was made near
j
Grodno, and here again the Germans were repulsed with slaughter in
their vain attempts to cross the river.
The fighting round about Augustowo Forest was of the most bitter
character the Germans desperately contesting the western approaches
in order to cover their line of retreat. 2 The Russians made a flank-
ing movement towards the south, and soon forced the Germans into re-
treat, v.hich at times seemed to have the character of a disorderly
3
flight. The stroke at Augustowo was well planned, and the whole
series of operations was managed with a skill worth of the reputation
which General Ruszky had won in Galicia. " A week o^ hard fighting
and hard marching sufficed to hurl the invaders back to their own
country, their crlory not a little deminished and their numbers re-
duced.
The German invasion from East Prussia had failed, somewhat in-
gloriously, and Russian prestige wa3 enhanced by their recent victory,
1. For a description of this battle, see an account by an eye-
witness in Stephen Graham, Russia And The World
,
p. 63.
2. The London Times
,
October 5, 1914, 9 f.
3. The London Times claims a great victory, but the Germans
deny the claim. See Per Volkerkri eg , V. 2, pp. 205-6, and Borkowski,
Ur.ser Heiliger Krieg
,
V. 2, pp. 2C.-2C1. The Germans report that
Japanese artillery took a prominent part in the operations around
Augustowo and Suwalki.
4. The Times History Of The War , V. 3, p. 240.
5. Ibid. ,p. 240.
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The Germans retired to their own country, followed by the Russians.
A pause of comparat ive inaction ensued After the battle of Augustowo.
The Germans now concentrated their attacks around Warsaw, with the
result that quiet reigned for some time in the East Fru33ian theatre
of war. The two side3 "duo; themselves in," and both adorted a rolicy
of "watchful waiting. "
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Ch after III.
The Second Invasion East Prussia.
Thruout October and the early days of November, the Russians and
the Germans faced each other in intrenched positions, which followed
approximately the line of the 'rentier. 1 The Germans attacked the
Russian trenches habitually, but they evidently had no thought of
aavancing. The real fighting on the Eastern Front, was in a differ-
ent theatre, in Foland. Thither Hindenburg transferred mo3t of his
troops for an advance on Wars w, and, for^the next few months, his
whole attention was concentrated there. Consequently the forces in
East Prussia were inferior to those o f the Russians, who advanced
slowly but surely. On November 14, they reached St alluronen. a Early
in December, the Russians were slowly penetrating the Maze of the
Masurian Lakes, which was the ne plus ultra for Russia. These opera-
tions were in the main, a war of trenches, for neither side could
spare large forces on this front.
On January 1st, the Russians stood on the eastern edge of East
Frussia, along the line of the Anger app and of the great Masurian
lakes, and on the southern edge mere or less along the frontier up to
1. The Times History 0' The ^ar , V. 3, p. 240.
2. See Per Volkerkriez
,
V. 4, p. 117. The Germans claim to
have defeated the Russians all along the line, and to h we taken
n
numerous prisoners. At Stalluponen they claim to have taken 500 pris
oner:, and north of Wyztyter Lakes, 4000 prisoners and 10 machine
guns.
3. Kelson's History Of The War
,
V. 6, p. 25.
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Mlawa. It is of importance to know that frost is a greit factor for
military operations in the East Prussian theatre of war, just as
water forms the chief obstacles on both 3ide3.
There was a lull in the fighting in the East Frussian theatre of
war auring the first three weeks of January, due to the bad weather.
In the first few days of January the weather was so mild that even
small streams, as the Rawka—-were free from ice, the whole of Poland
was one vast quagmire. Before the middle of January began a succes-
sion of alternate spells of cold weather and thaws. It was only afte:
January 2C that prolongea cold weather set in thruout the .'.'hole
Eastern theatre of war, and that for the ^irst time a winter campaign
based cn "ice and snow" could be contemplated.
During the last few days of January and the first of February,
the Germans made a desperate attemrt to reach Warsaw, but were re-
pulsed with great loss. u Since Hindenburg could not take Warsaw, he
had to prospect elsewhere. His next attempt must be a surprise, de-
livered where the elements of surprise existed—that is, with the
German system of railways behind it, and not the half-dozen botched
and cobbled Polish lines. The new theatre must clearly be East
Prussia, where the Russian movements were growing audacious and in-
AA
tolerable. This was to be Hindenburg' s culminating e^^ort, and if
succeeded, the communication between Warsaw and Petrograd wculd be
cut, the line of the Nierr.en and Narev taken, and the Folish capital
must fall.° Eut let us *irst fellow the fortunes of the Russians.
1. The Times History J The War , V. 4, p. 168.
2. Ibid
., pp. 168-9.
6. The Independent
,
February 22, 1915, p. 267.
4. Nelson's History Of The War , V. 6, p. 18.
5. Ibid., p. 19.
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When, about the end of January, the Grand Duke Nicholas, in
deference to the wishes of the Allies in the West, made a forward
movement in East Prussia, the force used was the ICth Army of four
corps, commanded by General Baron Sievers. 1 The German Army in East
Prussia was small at the moment, probably not more than three corps
.strong. Most of it was Landwehr and Landsturra, and the first line
elements seem to have been supplemented by portions of the 1st and
2Cth corps. The Russians advanced at a fast rate, in Spite of bid
weather, and by January 23 they began to threaten the German positions
at Lipno." North of the line of the Masurian lakes the progress of
the Russian forces was most marked round Darkehnen, to the west o^
Filkallen, and south-east of Tilsit, in the vallevs of the Szeszuppe
and of the Inster. Alonar their upper courses the bank3 o* these
rivers are wooded and marshy, farther west their banks rise and of per
an easier field for a military advance. 4 Towards the end of January
the marshes which shelter the positions around Insterburg were frozen.
Could the Russians taking advantage of the season, have pushed across
this barrier, a dangerous flank attack might have been carried out
i" Inst the German positions that extended along the line of the
5Angerapp and of the big lakes.
Cn the 7th of February the surprise which von Hindenburg had
prepared was sprung upon the invaders. He had brought from the West
the 21st Corps, and three reserve corns; from Germany he had got the
38th and 40th Corps, which were new formations; he had borrowed the
1. Nelson's His tory Of The War
,
V. 6, p. 25.
2. Ibid ., p. 25.
3. The Times History 0^ Th e War , V. 4, p. 186.
4. Ibid ., p. 187.
5. Ibid., p. 187.
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equivalent c* three corps from other parts of the Eastern front, in-
cluding the better part of the Silesian Landwehr Corps, and a reserve
corps of the guard.
1
He hud thus accumulated a total force of nine
corrs— about 300, 00C men- -to hurl upon General Siever's force, which
the Germans estimated at about 220, 0C0 men, and the English at about
12C,CCC. 2
The second cattle o* the Masurian lakes was a repetition of
Findenburg'3 Tannenberg tactics (the enveloping movement.) Since
details of the battle are lacking, the following extract from the
German War Report will give a vivid description of the nine days
battle in Masuria, called by Borkowski, a Radgjrwerk
,
or wheelwork of
battles.
The report -follows:- "By the beginning of February 1915, the
time had finally come when fresh German forces were available, +o be
brought to the East Prussian theatre war, for an encircling move-
ment against the Russians. The object of the operation wa3 the clear-
ing out of the Russian invader from German territory. Although hid-
den by the German fortifications and by German border troops, the
concentration of the troops for the offence took place behind the
German wings during the first part of February. On the seventh of
February 1915, the southern wing began the attack. A little later,
1. Nelson's History Of The War , V. 6, p. 26.
2. Ibid ., y . 26. This statement does not agree with the German
report, which declared the Russian forces to be 220, CCC strong, and
the German forces at 250, CCO. It seems that there has been either
a deliberate attempt to underestimate the strength of the Russian
forces, on the part of the English, or an exaggeration on the part
of the Germans. See Borkowski, Unser Heilige r Krieg , V. 2, p. 224.
3. Borkowski, Unser Heiliger Krie? , V. 2, p. 228.

the northern group (from the Tilsit reTion) began its movement. The
ground was thickly covered with snow and frozen, ind all the lakes
were covered with thick ice. Besides, an extraordinary snowfall had
fallen on the fifth of Februarv, and the strong winds had formed
tremendous snowdrifts in manv places, which hampered all communica-
tions by rail and road, and rendered all motor traffic impossible.
"T\e German leaders however, had provided well for the diffi-
culties of a winter campaign. The troops were dressed warmlv, .and
thousands of sleds -vere provided. In order to get at the main forces
of the enemy, the German Southern wing had firet to cross the ^orty
kilometer forest zone of Johazmisburg woods and the Pisseck. The
enemy had made numerous barriers and fortified the crossings of the
Pisseck. In Johannisburg and Bialla stronger Russian forces were
encamped there. In one of the positions occupied by the enemy, a
dance was announced for Sunday evening, when jU3t at this time, the
German offensive began, completely surp rising both the troops ana the
leaders.
"In all quietness the German columns broke thru their barriers
and in the afternoon they came in touch with the enemy. The young
troops of General Litzmann ^orced their way across the Pisseck at
Wrobeln during the afternoon and ni<?ht of February 8, 1915. In spite
of 3ncwed up roads and heavy snowdrifts which persisted all day, and
greatly impeded the operations, these trcops traversed forty kilo-
meters. The veteran troops of General von Falck came as far as
Johannisburi and took Snopken by storm, whereby two officers .and 450
men, ana two machine coins were captured. On the next dav, the German
troops continued the battle. The southern column of General Litz-
mann was already on the point of surprising the southern river ban*
near Geh3en, where it was suddenly attackea on it3 right flank by
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the enemy, who had advanced from Kolno. Immediately the Oexmans turn-
ed ujon this adversary and threw him back **rom whence he came. Five
hundred prisoners, five cannon, two machine ?uns, countless munition
wagons, and other material remained in our hands, while on the same
day, the neighboring column made 30C prisoners by Wrobeln and General
Falck stormed Johannisburg, which was defended by two Russian regi-
ments. Here the Russians lost 25CC prisoners, eight c .\nnon and
twelve machine guns. The Fikseck line wis in the German possession
on the eighth of February, and on the ninth, the advance on Lyck be-
gan.
"In the meantime the northern wing was not idle. It attempted
to attack the fortified positions of the Russian right wing, which
stretched from Spullen to Schorellen Forest, and -Prom there rio;ht up
to the Russian border. The ninth of February wa3 selectea for the
attack acainst these positions, which were rrovided with charged wire:.
The position was taken and the enemv fled in a south-eastern direc-
tion. The Germans followed by forced marches, and compelled the Rus-
sians to retreat to previously fortified rositicns south of Wirballen.
This position was 3tormed on the ten^h of February, and much booty
and a l-.r.^e number of prisoners were taken. By February 20, 1915,
the Russians were driven away from East Prussia, which was now freed
from ''"he enemy
The Germans proclaimed this second victory of the Masurian Lakes
as another Tannenberg. The German reports cldim that the Russian
losses -vere over 165, COO, including more than 100,000 prisoners, and
a great amount of booty, including 200 machine guns, and 300 cannon oi
1. Quoted from Per Volk
e
rkri e? t V. 4, pp. 122-25.
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1
V.iriOUS SI 29 3.
Again the Germans pressed forward and made frantic efforts to
get past the fortreas of Osowice and cross the Nieme-i, hut they had
little success. Strong Russian forces were set in motion, and counter^
attacked with such energy that the invaders were pushed back. 2 On
March fifth, the serious attack on Osowice ended, and orders were
issued for a rradual retreat to the East Prussian frontier. 3
Hindenburr's two victories in the Masurian Lake Region were of
the first magnitude. These victories not only enabled him to saf e •»
guard and make secure up to the present time the German territories
in the eaat, but they menaced Warsaw and even Petrograd. To Hinden-
burg falls the honor of having taken the largest numbers of prisoners
, 4in history, in single operations, sxcert at Metz and Paris in 1870.
On the other hand, the Russians lost heavily in men and material, yet
they were not obliged to lay down their arms and 3ue for peace. New
ani ss were formed to combat the invader, and only when the Russians
could no longer suprly their armies in the field (May-September,
1215) did the Germans force them into retreat past Warsaw. In spite
of their heavy losses the Russians are very formidable and are not to
be despised, i* General Brussiio^f's Galician campaign in 1916 is any
1. Eorkowski, Unser Heiliger Krie ?, V. 2, p. 229. The Russians
claim that the German reports are fictitious, ana affirm that they
lost only 3C,0CC men and about 80 guns. See the Times History Of
Thenar, V. 4, p. 19C, and Nels on's History Of The War , V. 6, p. 29.
2 - Kelson's H i story Of The War, V. 6, p. 32.
3. Ibid
. ,
p. 32.
4. This statement may need to be qualified, since General
Brussiloff captured almost 50C,0C0 Au3trians and thousands of guns
in hi 3 Galician campaign in June-Augu3t, 1916.
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indi cation. The Bus si -an revolution h s changed the situation to an
extent that cannot as vet be estimated with certainty. At the present
moment the Germans are making every e^ort to conclude a separate
peace with the provisional government, but so far, their peace over-
tures have failed, and it is hoped by the Entente Allies that Russia
will rise and attack the common enemy with renewed strength and vigor.
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